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Introduction
Rising health care cost and resource constraints confront policy makers with the challenge to ensure
the financial sustainability of health care systems, without jeopardizing the main health system
objectives. To respond to this challenge,many European countries have introduced patient payments
for publicly financed health care services (patient cost-sharing) (1–4). The potential of patient cost-
sharing to contribute to the sustainability of the health care system relies on two elements. First,
cost-sharing generates additional sources of funding. Hence, through cost-sharing, some of the
health care cost might be shifted from public budgets to patients. Second, cost-sharing has the
potential to improve efficiency in publicly financed health care, as it is expected that patients, when
facedwith the price of health care services, reduce the utilization of unnecessary and low-value health
care (5, 6). It is also expected that this could slow the growth of health care costs. However, opponents
of cost-sharing question the potential of cost-sharing to improve efficiency and instead point to its
potentially negative effects on equity in health care. This is documented by evidence, among them
the best known is the RAND health insurance experiment (7, 8).
Whether the potential of cost-sharing can be realized without threatening equity and consumers
financial protection depends on various context-specific factors as well as on the design of the
cost-sharing systems applied by European countries.
Patient Cost-Sharing and Resources Generation
The ability of cost-sharing to generate revenues for the health sector is of particular interest to policy
makers in countries with a poorly financed health care systems, where the lack of sufficient resources
impedes the provision of health care services with an adequate quality and access. The evidence
indicates that inmanyCentral and Eastern European (CEE) countries, cost-sharing is seen primarily
as a measure to reduce existing deficits in the underfinanced health care systems (9).
Designing a cost-sharing system, which raises substantial resources, is not a straightforward
process and requires data on how consumers react to the change in the price of health care services.
Higher charges might provide a greater potential for revenues. Yet, if demand is price sensitive, such
cost-sharing system might substantially reduce the utilization of health care services. This limits
the revenues generated, and also might adversely affect the population’s health status (if consumers
forego the use of necessary care). For this reason, policy makers rather opt for cost-sharing to be
sufficiently low to assure that the majority of consumers are able to pay the fees while offering
even lower or no charges for those who cannot pay or who use health care frequently (10). A
review of cost-sharing arrangements for health care services in European countries (1) shows that
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in CEE countries, co-payments (a flat fee) for out-patient visit
ranges from approximately 1AC (Bulgaria, Czech Republic) to
approximately 3AC (Latvia Estonia for a visit to specialist) (data
for 2008–2009). In Western European countries, the fees are
higher, yet their contribution to health care financing is still rather
marginal, e.g., in Germany, a 10AC charge per first patient visit
to the medical doctor in each calendar quarter, which existed
till 2013, generated a net revenues of about two billion Euros a
year (approximately 1% of public health insurance expenditure)
(11). In some European countries (e.g., France, Slovenia), where
cost-sharing takes the form of co-insurance and patients pay a
percentage of health care cost, a private complementary health
insurance, frequently purchased by consumers, takes over the
responsibility and covers patients’ cost-sharing obligations.
The revenues from cost-sharing might be substantially
restricted because of exemptions or compensations for selected
population groups and payment limits, which are broadly applied
in European countries. For example, in Latvia, due to exemptions
(approximately one third of the population is exempted) and
payments caps, the revenues from cost-sharing are reduced by
half and accounted for 7% of total providers’ revenues (12).
Although the presence of protection mechanisms, which are
intended to diminish adverse equity effects of cost-sharing,
deserves credit, their design, and applications leave much to be
desired. The evidence indicates that the exemption/reduction
mechanisms applied by European countries are not always
well-targeted to those who need protection, for example, the
criteria for the exemption/reduction includes occupation (e.g.,
medical professionals or war veterans are entitled) (13). In
addition to an inadequate design of protection measures, their
implementation sometimes fails in practice, for example, due to a
problematic identification of vulnerable groups (e.g., low income
individuals) or the complexity of the protection system, which is
not transparent for patients and health care providers (14).
Patient Cost-Sharing and Efficiency
Improvements
In thewell-funded health care systems ofWestern European coun-
tries, patient cost-sharing is often implemented as a measure to
increase patient responsibility and thus, for a more efficient use of
health care resources. Economic theory provides the rationale for
the application of patient cost-sharing for the purpose of efficiency
improvement. Since the price is amajor determinant of the quanti-
ties of goods or services demanded, providing health care free-of-
charge at the point of use (as it is in case of pure public financing)
increases the quantity demanded (15–17). Part of this demand is
considered to be excess demand since the marginal benefits of the
consumption of these additional units of health care are lower than
the marginal costs of their provision. From an economic point of
view, efficiency then deteriorates as the best value for resources
spent is not obtained (18). Thus, economic theory predicts that
if consumers have to pay, they become more cost-conscious, i.e.,
they evaluate the expected benefits before the actual service use
and utilize only those services whose benefits exceed the cost for
them (5, 19). Imposing prices on the use of health care services
is expected to affect also other forms of health-related behavior
of health care consumers, i.e., provide incentives for a healthier
lifestyle and prevention, which also might lead to efficiency gains
in health care (20).
Nevertheless, the potential of cost-sharing to improve effi-
ciency and further contain costs relies on the assumptions that the
demand for health care is price sensitive and the decision on the
use of services is made by consumers. Moreover, when making
decisions, consumers are able to adequately value the services, i.e.,
estimate short- and long-term clinical benefits from the service
consumption and the consequences of their behavior (21). While
the first assumption is typically met, i.e., the quantity demanded
formost health care services reacts to changes in price (the exemp-
tion can be, for example, lifesaving surgical procedures), the other
assumptions are more doubtful (22).
First, the decision to use health care services is often not a
patients’ choice but rather a physician’s decision and in such case
implementing prices on services cannot be expected to change
the quantity demanded. The evidence from the USA indicates
that even if cost-sharing reduces the number of patient visits, the
intensity of services provided remains unchanged, as it is largely
driven by the providers (23). Therefore, cost-sharing alone with-
out adequate supply-side measures, i.e., incentives for health care
providers, has poor effectiveness in controlling the cost of health
care (24). The importance of supply-side measures to improve
efficiency and control cost of health care is well-recognized in
Europe. Yet, more effort should be made to align demand- and
supply-side measures for better performances of the health care
systems.
Second, given the existing information issues (consumers’
insufficient medical knowledge, uncertainty), it is questionable
whether consumers are able to adequately value the services and
distinguish between low- and high-value services. Particularly,
in case of services with positive externalities or merit goods
(e.g., preventive services), it is well-recognized that individual or
social benefits from their consumption are not fully recognized
and considered by individual consumers (25). Hence, for a cost-
sharing system to be able to enhance efficiency, it should give
price signals to help consumers to discriminate between low- and
high-value services. However, in European countries, the amounts
of patient payments are generally not aligned with the values
of the services for patients. Most countries apply uniform co-
payments for broad categories of services (visit to a GP/specialists,
hospitalization day) and few countries base the payment amounts
on the actual service cost (co-insurance, deductibles) (1). Such
“one size fits all” cost-sharing does not adequately moderate the
utilization of services and is likely to reduce both essential and
non-essential services, limiting the efficiency gain (26). This was
confirmed in various studies, including the RAND Health Insur-
ance Experiments conducted in the 1970s andmore recent studies,
which showed that an increase in patient cost-sharing results in
the reduction of not only ineffective care but also of medically
appropriate and essential care, and the low income and chronically
sick are disproportionally affected by cost-sharing (7, 27–31). The
evidence on the effects of cost-sharing policy in few European
countrieswhere such analyses have been performed, also confirms
the adverse equity effects of cost-sharing (32–34). For example,
the results of the study by Lostao et al. (32) indicate that patient
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cost-sharing in France reduces the frequency of physician visits
and that this decrease is greater for persons from the lower socio-
economic groups. Similarly, Rückert et al. (34) concluded that
co-payments inGermany detained socially deprived patients from
visiting a physician.
A Step Forward
Despite the policy expectations for enhancing the sustainability
of health care financing, the cost-sharing solutions applied by
European countries have limited potential to improve efficiency
or to generate additional resources. To better contribute to the
sustainability of health care systems, cost-sharing arrangements in
European countries should be reconsidered. The need to amend
cost-sharing policies has been already put forward in health care
debates. A new approach to cost-sharing called value-based cost-
sharing (value-based insurance design) has been proposed (35).
In this system, fees for health care services are differentiated based
on their cost-effectiveness or on the health benefits they provide;
health care services or goods, which are proven to be cost-effective
are provided with no charges, particularly for patients who can
benefit the most from their consumption (19, 36). Value-based
cost-sharing has been increasingly applied for pharmaceuticals.
In the area of health care services, it has been less common. Only
some attempts to relate the level of fees to the value of services can
be observed in European countries. For example, a review of cost-
sharing arrangements for health care services in 27 EU countries
(1) indicates that in a majority of these countries maternity and
preventive services are excluded from the cost-sharing obligation.
An interesting example comes from the Netherlands, where some
insurers offer an option for their enrollees to be exempted from
obligatory deductibles, if one uses services of preferred providers
(i.e., providers who adhere to price and quality agreements) (37,
38). A common European countries’ practice of reducing fees
for chronically ill should be also considered as a step toward
value-based cost-sharing.
The main barrier to the implementation of value-based
cost-sharing is the lack of data on the health benefits or
cost-effectiveness of health care interventions and the high-
administrative costs of such system.Nevertheless, European coun-
tries should consider a broader use of value-based cost-sharing
in the future. This system could complement supply-side mea-
sures to improve quality and efficiency in health care, such as
paying-for-performance and paying-for-coordination (39, 40).
Furthermore, the fiscal efficiency of cost-sharing systems should
be measured and should constitute important evaluation crite-
ria of cost-sharing policy, particularly in countries, which aim
to generate additional resources for health care through patient
payments.
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